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Abstract
Political economy theories on the natural resource cursepredict that natural resource
wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in o¢ ce.
Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political o¢ ce depends
on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the
types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political
leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we nd that both institutions and resource
types matter for the e¤ect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth
derived from natural resources a¤ects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but
not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with
positive e¤ects on the duration in political o¢ ce, minerals are associated with negative
duration e¤ects.
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1 Introduction
Over the last couple of decades, researchers have gathered mounting evidence that wealth derived
from natural resources contributes to numerous dysfunctional economic and political outcomes
from poor and uneven economic development, to authoritarianism, corruption, and violent con-
ict. These ndings are commonly referred to as the resource curse.1 Lately, increasing
attention has been drawn to the political incentives triggered by resource booms. In a paper in
this journal, Robinson et al. (2006, p.447) argue that: ... the political incentives that resource
endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse.
In most political economy models on the resource curse, a key incentive of political leaders is
to stay in power to harvest not only the current, but also the future rents from natural resource
extraction. Moreover, resource rents equip political leaders with funds that can be used to
increase their chances of surviving in political o¢ ce, via di¤erent forms of patronage or strategic
spending, tax cuts, or political oppression.2 For these reasons we would expect abundance in
natural resources to be associated with longer durations in political o¢ ce.
However, there may also be counteracting forces at work. For example, resource wealth
may motivate oppositional groups to seize power, and certain types of natural resources may
provide nancing for the activities of rebel factions.3 Alternatively, the political leadership may
consist of di¤erent political elites competing over the rents from holding o¢ ce.4 If these two
latter mechanisms are relevant, natural resources may be expected to destabilize the political
leaderships and lead to shorter durations in o¢ ce. Finally, the political leaderships may be
e¤ectively constrained by di¤erent types of institutional arrangements. Whether the relationship
between natural resource wealth and political survival is positive, neutral, or negative may, thus,
generally depend on the value of the resource rents, the type of resources, and the political and
institutional environment.
The relationship between resource wealth and the duration of a political leadership remains
mainly theoretical.5 We aim to ll this gap in the literature by employing the broadest possible
sample, given the available data, to investigate this relationship. This leaves us with a sample
1See, e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995) on economic development, Ross (2001) on authoritarianism, Bhattacharyya
and Hodler (2010) on corruption, and Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) on civil war. Van der Ploeg (2011) and Frankel
(2010) o¤er two recent overviews of the empirical and theoretical research on the resource curse.
2See Caselli and Cunningham (2009) for a systematic review over how political leadership incentives may be
inuenced by natural resources, Robinson et al. (2006) and Robinson and Torvik (2005) for di¤erent forms of
strategic spending, and Ross (2001, 2008) for an overview of the so-called rentier state theory.
3See, e.g., Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), or Lujala (2010).
4As in, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2004; 2010), and Caselli (2006).
5Some empirical studies on resource wealth and political survival do exist, but these have typically focused on
either particular subgroups of countries, or on specic polity and regime types. Cuaresma et al. (2011) analyze
the relationship between oil and the duration of dictatorships, and Omgba (2009) analyzes the duration in o¢ ce
of chief executives of 26 African countries. Ross (2008) employs a broader sample of 170 countries from 1960 to
2002, but his main focus is on regime survival (e.g. the survival of authoritarianismand democracy) and not
on political survival, as in the present study. In a new and complementary study to ours, Wright et al. (2012)
document a positive e¤ect of oil wealth on autocratic regime survival using a di¤erent methodology (ordinary and
conditional logit) and regime duration variable (from Geddes et al. 2012) than we do.
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of up to 152 countries and 617 leadership durations (henceforth LDs).6 The natural resource
variables that we include in our analysis are various measures of oil income and wealth, mineral
rents, and indicators for di¤erent types of diamond extraction.
Our empirical results are strongly suggestive that resource endowments matter for political
survival. Oil wealth is a particularly important determinant, and its association with political
survival can even be seen in the raw data. Figure 1 plots the Kaplan-Meier survival function for
oil poor (solid line) and oil rich (dashed line) political leaderships, respectively, and the graph
indicates that the average survival rate in political o¢ ce is higher for the oil rich than for the oil
poor political leaderships.7
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Figure 1: Oil and political survival in the baseline sample of 138 countries and 500 leadership
durations.
When we investigate this relationship more rigorously, using survival analysis, our baseline esti-
mates suggest that an increase in the value of oil production in a countrys GDP by one standard
deviation increases the expected duration in political o¢ ce by approximately 10 months on av-
erage. The positive and statistically signicant association between oil and political survival is
robust to using a range of parametric and non-parametric survival models, and to the inclusion
of potentially confounding economic, political, demographic and geopolitical factors.
6We dene a leadership duration as the duration in o¢ ce of the party which has the chief executive, or, in the
case where chief executive is not associated with a particular party, the duration in o¢ ce of the chief executive.
The precise denition is provided in Section 3.1.
7The Kaplan-Meier suvival estimate is the conditional probability of survival beyond time t, given survival up
until t: S^ (t) = 
jjtjt

nj dj
nj

, where nj is the number of political leaderships at risk at time tj and dj is the
number of political failures at time tj .
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The graph in Figure 1 is uninformative about confounding factors, and the baseline estimates
may also conceal important nonlinearities in the data. In particular, the theoretical predictions
on the political incentives of natural resources are often conditioned on institutional parameters.
The political e¤ects of natural resources are expected to be stronger the lower the level of
democracy, or, alternatively, the weaker are the constraints on the executive.8 Additionally,
resource type may matter. Because natural resource wealth might facilitate the nancing of war,
it may make armed conicts more likely.9 Moreover, easily accessible and extractable resources,
such as minerals and certain types of diamonds, may provide nancing for competing elites
or rebel groups and thus increase the odds that the incumbent is ousted from political o¢ ce.
Lujala (2010) provides empirical evidence that both the onset and the duration of conict are
positively associated with the accessibility of the resources. The hypothesis that di¤erent types
of resources may a¤ect social tension and conict di¤erently is further supported by the nding
in Smith (2004) that oil wealth is associated with a lower, not higher, likelihood of civil war and
anti-state protests.
Investigating the e¤ects of political institutions and resource types on political survival, both
separately and in interaction, we nd that both dimensions matter. First, while most of the
resource variables are signicant determinants of political survival in non-democratic polities, we
nd no systematic e¤ects within the sample of democratic polities.10 The pattern in Figure 1
suggesting a positive relationship between oil and political survival is hence exclusively driven by
non-democracies. Second, we nd that the type of resource matters. Those resource types that
are the least technically appropriable, oil and non-lootable diamonds, are positively related to
political survival. On the other hand, those resources that are the most technically appropriable,
minerals and lootable diamonds, are found to be negatively associated with survival in o¢ ce.11
In the light of the insights from the conict literature, one might thus hypothesize that conict
should be a main mechanisms by which di¤erent resource types a¤ect political survival di¤erently.
We therefore run a set of regressions where we include conict variables among the regressors. As
expected, the results from these regressions suggest that conict is negatively related to political
survival. However, the resource e¤ects remain signicant and, if anything, stronger. Thus, our
main results on the e¤ects of resource type do not appear to be exclusively driven by violent
conict.
Our data do not allow us to investigate all the di¤erent mechanisms by which di¤erent
resource types may have di¤erent e¤ects for political survival. However, one straightforward
interpretation is that di¤erent types of resources may be exploited by di¤erent groups in the
8As in, e.g., Robinson et al. (2006) and further surveyed in van der Ploeg (2011).
9See, e.g., Collier and Hoe­ er (2004).
10With respect to institutions, we follow the standard approach to institutional categorization and account for
both polity types (democracy, intermediate, autocracy), autocratic regime types (military, single party, personal-
istic regimes, and monarchies), and, in the sample of democratic polities, constitutional features (e.g., the form
of government and the electoral rules).
11The term technical appropriability refers to the physical and economical characteristics of the natural
resource. In particular, resources which are easy to extract, very valuable, can be stored, are easily transported,
and are easily sold, are characterized as technically appropriable (Boschini et al. 2007).
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population. In particular, resources that are less technically appropriable, such o¤shore oil and
most forms of subsoil oil reservoirs, require a high level of technology and large investments
which can only be nanced by large companies or governments. These types of resources are
also examples of point source resources that are typically easier for the government to tax
than di¤use resources.12 Other examples of point source resources include natural gas and
non-lootable diamonds. On the other hand, the appropriation of more di¤use resources, such as
several forms of minerals and lootable diamonds, requires less technology and investments and
can more easily be exploited by non-elites. These types of resources can also be more di¢ cult
for the government to tax. This is consistent with insights from the conict literature, where
only the technically appropriable resources are associated with violent conict, arguably via
the nancing of the activities of rebel groups. However, the funds from the appropriation of
di¤use resources may not only nance violent conict, but could also help sustain other types of
political activities by oppositional groups. So, while oil and non-lootable diamonds to a larger
extent may be exploited by the political leaderships in power, minerals and lootable diamonds
may provide nancing for the political activities of the opposition. If this mechanism is relevant,
oil and minerals may be expected to exert di¤erent e¤ects on the survival in o¢ ce of the political
leaderships, which may explain our ndings on the role of resource type.
Measuring political survival is not always straightforward. Past contributions tend to focus on
the duration in o¢ ce of the chief executive or head of state (in authoritarian regimes usually the
dictator, in democracies commonly the prime minister or the president).13 The chief executives
duration in o¢ ce is, however, in many situations an imperfect measure of the continuity of a
factions political power.14 We therefore argue that a political leadership duration is better
measured by the continuity in power of the party of the chief executive. Hence, we consider
a transition of political power to take place when in the following year the chief executive is
from a di¤erent party. Because this denition is independent of the specic status of the chief
executive, it facilitates comparison across di¤erent polities and regime types. Importantly, using
this measure of a LD, we reduce the likelihood of estimation bias due to specic institutional
arrangements, such as the term limit imposed upon the chief executive. We do, however, also
investigate the duration in o¢ ce of the chief executive, and nd that our results are not exclusively
driven by our specic choice of LD operationalization.
A general concern in empirical comparative politics is endogeneity bias. We take several
steps to address this concern. First, the duration in o¢ ce of a political leadership may reect
endogenous political responses to changes in the resource environment, which in turn might
imply endogeneity in the categorization of the LDs into polity types (democratic, intermediate,
12On the distinction between point sourceresources and di¤useresources, see, e.g. Auty (1997) or Boschini
et al. (2007). Notice that this distinction is not precise with respect to exactly which types of natural resources
belong in which category, and while some types of minerals may be categorized as di¤use resources, others are
better dened as point source resources.
13See, e.g., Cuaresma et al. (2011), Ross (2008), and Omgba (2009).
14Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) include a discussion of the di¤erent sources of bias which may arise from
focussing on the transition of chief executive in the study of political survival in democracy.
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or autocratic). We address this concern by basing our categorization of a LD on the institutional
performance prior to when the chief executives party assumes o¢ ce. Hence, the regressions
are preconditioned on the inherited institutional environment that a political leadership faces
when it enters into political o¢ ce. Still, one may be concerned that even the inherited set of
institutions may be endogenous to the resource environment, since the resource environment
is often quite stable over time. We therefore control for institutional characteristics that are
known to be associated with the duration in o¢ ce of political leaderships and at the same
time may correlate with the resource environment, such as autocratic regime types, or specic
constitutional features. In some regressions we also control for the average duration in o¢ ce of
the political leaderships in the country, as a proxy for potentially omitted factors that correlate
with both the resource endowment and political survival. In the sample of autocracies it appears
that some regime types, in particular monarchy and personal rule, correlate with the resource
environment to such a degree that the e¤ects of the two in some specications cannot safely
be separated. An available interpretation is that the e¤ect of oil on political survival is partly
working via the survival of specic types of autocratic institutions. However, in the samples
of intermediates and democracies, the main results remain robust to all of these exercises: in
intermediate polities, the e¤ect of oil survives even when controlling for the average leadership
duration in the country, and in the sample of democratic polities there are no robust resource
e¤ects no matter which set of institutional controls we include, or exclude, in the regressions.
Second, the natural resource variables might also be endogenous in our regressions, as o¢ ce-
seeking political leaders democratic or non-democratic may be tempted to increase the in-
tensity of exploration and extraction to inuence their own probability of staying in o¢ ce. We
address this concern by employing, as a robustness check on our most preferred specication,
several alternative measures of oil income and oil wealth. While our baseline variable the
production value of oil in GDP is the most relevant with respect to theory, it may be more
susceptible to endogeneity than other, alternative measures which are less closely aligned with
the theoretical models. The results from these robustness exercises suggest that the e¤ect of
oil remains qualitatively similar for all of our alternative oil measures.15 Interestingly, when
employing the size of the proven oil reserves per capita (instead of the value of oil production
in GDP) which perhaps may be argued to be the least susceptible to endogeneity concerns
the oil e¤ects are even more precisely estimated in both the intermediate and the autocratic
subsamples.
Finally, we investigate the robustness of our main results to the inclusion of regional indicators
and to a host of alternative model specications and survival models. The results from these
exercises demonstrate that our main results are not driven by any specic region, including the
oil rich middle east. Moreover, our main results go through for a large variety of empirical
specications and survival models.
15The alternative oil measures we employ in our robustness specications are the value of oil per capita, several
predetermined oil measures (dated back to either the entry of the current LD, or to 1970), and the size of the
proven oil reserves per capita.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a literature review on the
arguments that could explain a relationship between political survival and natural resources. In
Section 3, we present our empirical design and our data. Section 4 presents and discusses the
main results, and Section 5 o¤ers a broad selection of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
As discussed in the introduction, there is a large and growing body of theoretical literature that
explicitly or implicitly analyze the association between natural resource wealth and political
survival. Additionally, some empirical studies do exist, and there is also a well of case studies
suggesting that natural resources a¤ect the duration in o¢ ce of political leaderships. A full-
edged literature review is outside the scope of this paper, so we restrict ourselves to reviewing a
representative set of contributions that illustrate the di¤erent mechanisms that may be driving
our results.
2.1 Theoretical mechanisms
A natural point of departure is the so-called oil hinders democracyliterature, which dates back
to the contribution on rentier states and oil in Iran by Mahdavy (1970).16 One explanation for
the rentier e¤ectof oil is that governments endowed with an abundance of oil use low tax rates
and high public spending to dampen the pressure for democratic reforms. The rentier e¤ect can
be decomposed into three related pieces (Ross 2001; 2008): (i) a taxation e¤ect; (ii) a spending
e¤ect; and (iii) a group formation e¤ect.17 Hence, the rentier e¤ect implies that the government
takes a strategic action in order to increase its probability of remaining in power.
A di¤erent strand of the literature is more concerned with di¤erent types of non-democratic
regimes. Acemoglu et al. (2004) develop a model where kleptocratic rulers that expropriate
the wealth and incomes of their citizens can remain in power without maintaining a signicant
base of support in society. The success of kleptocrats rests on their ability to use a particular
political strategy termed divide-and-rulesince members of a society need to cooperate in order
to depose a kleptocrat. The kleptocrat may undermine such cooperation by using the rents from
natural resources to bribe other groups in order to maintain his position.
16See also Ross (2001); Jensen and Wantechekon (2004); Epstein et al. (2006); Ulfelder (2007); Tsui (2010);
Gassebner et al. (2008); Dunning (2008); Goldberg et al. (2009); Aslaksen (2010).
17The taxation e¤ect suggests that when governments derive su¢ cient revenues from oil, they are likely to tax
their populations less heavily. In turn, the population will be less likely to demand accountability from, and
representation in, the government. Ross (2008) nds a strong correlation between a countrys oil rents per capita,
and the size of government consumption.
The intuition for the spending e¤ect is that oil wealth may lead to greater spending on patronage, which
dampens latent pressures for democratization. Ross (2008) nds a strong negative correlation between oil rents
and taxes on goods, even with country xed e¤ects.
According to the group formation e¤ect, the government will use its largesse to prevent the formation of social
groups which are independent from the state and hence which may be inclined to demand political rights from
its government.
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Cuaresma et al. (2011) analyze a setting similar to that used in Acemoglu et al. (2004),
but propose an alternative mechanism. In their model, which is an extension of Gallego and
Pitchik (2004), the autocratic leadership (or dictator) uses the rents from oil extraction for
both personal gain and to pay o¤ potential opposition, and chooses the optimal level of oil
exploitation accordingly. A group of kingmakers decides whether to stage a coup and establish a
new leadership. The model nds that a higher endowment of natural resources leads to a lower
probability of the oppositional group staging a coup détat.
Military regimes might be characterized by di¤erent mechanisms than those used to categorize
other types of non-democratic regimes. For example, the military can act as an agent of the elite,
but may turn against this group in order to create a regime more in line with the military leaders
objectives. Analyzing the e¤ects of the natural resource endowments in this setting, Acemoglu
et al. (2010) show that two opposing e¤ects for non-democratic regimes emerge. On the one
hand, more natural resources allow the regime to nance military repression and thus increase
the regimes likelihood to persist. On the other hand, the military is more tempted to undertake
coups against the oligarchic regime, which decreases the survival likelihood of the existing regime.
A common strand uniting the theories surveyed above is that these caveats mainly apply in
a non-democratic political environment. However, natural resource wealth may also be relevant
for political survival in democratic polities. Robinson and Torvik (2005) propose a theory on
so-called white elephants, which refers to economically ine¢ cient public investments. They
demonstrate that the very ine¢ ciency of such projects is what makes them politically appealing.
This is particularly so when the ability to commit to ine¢ cient projects critically depends on
partisanship. The fact that in the future not all politicians can credibly undertake economically
ine¢ cient projects, gives those who can do so a strategic advantage in the present. Natural
resource revenues increase the value of being in power, thereby making it more attractive to
implement ine¢ cient projects that can give incumbents a strategic advantage in elections.
Employing a similar partisan framework as Robinson and Torvik (2005), Robinson et al.
(2006) develop a model in which the incumbent can either consume the resource income or
can distribute it as patronage to bias the election outcome in his own favor. In this model,
institutions play a central role in the relationship between resource income and political survival.
If the economy is characterized by institutions that limit the ability of politicians to engage in
clientelism, resource booms should not a¤ect the incumbents re-election probability.
The theories reviewed above provide several reasons why natural resources might increase
the chance of political survival. However, as discussed above, some of these mechanisms could
have the reverse e¤ect, particularly when considering the militarys incentive to stage a coup
(Acemoglu et al. 2010), but also when the resource boom is temporary (Robinson et al. 2006).
Additionally, Caselli (2006) develops a model of the natural resource curse which predicts a
negative relationship between resource income and political survival. The models essential idea
is that natural resource wealth is more easily appropriated by the governing elites than are other
sources of wealth. As a result, countries with large natural resource endowments experience
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frequent power struggles in the sense that potential challengers have a stronger incentive to
replace the existing government by staging a coup or engaging in other forms of forced leadership
changes. Hence, in countries with large amounts of natural resources, there will be a greater
probability that the government will lose power to challengers.
2.2 Case studies and empirical evidence
In addition to the more formal theoretical and empirical contributions, there is a considerable
amount of case study evidence on how natural resource income has been used to maintain power.
Several studies document a pattern of natural resource windfalls leading to an overexpansion
of the public sector, and relate these observation to patronage and clientelism. In a study of
oil booms e¤ects in Nigeria, Gavin (1993) found that between 1973 and 1987, employment
contracted in all sectors except for the service sector which includes government employment.
Importantly, this hiring e¤ort was seen as a deliberate policy by the government to stay in
power despite an earlier promise to withdraw in 1975. Similarly, in copper-dependent Zambia:
To secure power and access to copper income United National Independence Party (UNIP)
and the president Kenneth Kaunda in 1972 banned other political parties and put in place a
system that favored UNIP members o¤ering employment and power(Robinson et al., 2006, p.
464). In Trinidad and Tobago, Auty (1999) blames an overexpanded public sector in response
to windfall income for the weak economic performance, and notes that the government share of
formal employment reached 50 percent during the period of the resource boom. Ecuador and
Venezuela are two additional examples of countries where the public sector has expanded as
a result of booms in the price of oil. In Ecuador, numerous governments have made attempts
towards scal restraint and structural reform, but none has withstood social pressure long enough
to signicantly alter the countrys political economy. According to Eifert et al. (2002, p. 13):
14.5 percent of all oil revenues [in Ecuador] were earmarked directly to the military in 1989;
and 67.6 percent were allocated to nance the public wage bill and other programs, notably the
rural roads program, a politically important source of patronage. With regard to Venezuela,
Eifert et al. (2002, p. 14) argue that: [o]il revenues have shaped Venezuelan politics for decades,
creating a rentier state legitimized by patronage and entrenched constituencies whose continued
loyalty are attached directly to state expenditures funded by oil rents.
In addition to political equilibrium e¤ects, natural resource endowments may also cause
changes in the rules of the political game. Guliyev (2009) discusses several examples of constitu-
tions being manipulated in favor of the survival in o¢ ce of the political leadership. In particular,
there are several examples of strong presidents who eliminated term limits to prolong their hold
on power. The 2004 referendum in Belarus (whose state elites depend heavily on Russian oil
and gas transit) lifted the two-term limit on President Lukashenko who was in power since 1994.
Uzbekistan held two referendums in 1995 and 2002 that extended President Islam Karimovs
term. In 2007, Kazakhstans parliament amended the constitution to lift the term limit on the
tenure of President Nazarbayev, who has been in power since the countrys independence in
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1991. In natural gas rich Turkmenistan, the Peoples Council abolished term limits in 1999 and
announced that the now-defunct ruler, Saparmurat Niyazov, would be president for life(p.3).
In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez won approval in the February 2009 referendum for a constitutional
amendment that enables him to run for the presidency when his term ends in 2012. In April
2008, President Paul Biya of Cameroon, a commodity-based African economy, had parliament
pass a constitutional bill abolishing a two-term limit restriction. The updated legislation made it
possible for Mr. Biya to extend his 25-year rule. In November 2008, President Abdelaziz Boute-
ika of Algeria also had his two-term restriction abolished. Mr. Bouteika became president of
the country in 1999 and was re-elected in a landslide victory in 2004. After the change, he was
able to run for a third time in the presidential race which he won in April 2009 (Guliyev, 2009).
The analysis presented in this paper also relates to an interesting study by Goldberg et al.
(2009), which shows, using data from U.S. gubernatorial elections, that the competitiveness of
the electoral environment is inuenced by resource dependence. Their empirical investigation
indicates that the margin of victory in gubernatorial elections and the incumbent governors
share of votes increases the more the state depends on natural resources (measured by oil and
coal production as a share of state income).
Finally, a considerable empirical literature links natural resources to the onset of civil conict
(e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Smith, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; de Soysa and Neumayer, 2007;
Lujala, 2010). Particularly interesting given the aim of our study is the work by Lujala (2010),
who concentrates on the issue of how rebel access to natural resources a¤ects conict. Her
nding strongly supports the idea that access to natural resources is essential for the funding of
violent conict by rebel groups. According to her study, both onshore (as opposed to o¤shore)
oil production and lootable (as opposed to non-lootable) diamonds increase the risk of conict
onset.
2.3 How the present study relates to the existing literature
Although there are several theories, case studies, and some within-country empirical analyses
that discuss how resource income can be linked to political duration, there are few systematic
empirical studies of this subject across countries. One exception is Cuaresma et al. (2011) who
analyze the relationship between oil endowments and the duration of dictatorships. They use the
Archigos database developed by Goemans et al. (2009) to calculate how long dictators remain
in power. Their main result is that a high oil endowment signicantly increases the duration of
a dictatorship for both a relatively large subsample as well as a sample of the most terrifying
dictators.
In a more restricted sample, Omgba (2009) analyzes the duration in o¢ ce of the heads of
state of 26 African countries. The study is suggestive of a positive link between oil rents and the
duration in o¢ ce of African leaders, but other mineral rents are not found to exhibit the same
stabilizing e¤ects.
Ross (2008) analyzes the relationship between oil and leadership durations in a broader group
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of countries. To identify the transition from one leader to the next, he also relies on the Archigos
database, which identies the term in o¢ ce of a countrys e¤ective leader. He nds that across
di¤erent income and regional categories, leaders in oil-producing countries last longer. Ross
further separates the e¤ects of oil rents on duration between authoritarian states and democratic
states, and his results indicate that while oil revenues reduces the likelihood that an autocratic
leader will depart o¢ ce, oil wealth has no e¤ect on the longevity of democratic leaders.
Smith (2004) and Ulfelder (2007) both analyze the association between natural resource
wealth and political survival. However, their focus is on the duration of autocracy as such, and not
on the duration in o¢ ce of political leaderships. Both studies rely on the Polity dataset (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2009) to measure regime type, and both studies nd that resource wealth, and in
particular oil and energy measures, impede transitions to democracy.18 Our study complements
these studies and suggests a mechanism by which oil may impede democratic transitions namely
by allowing non-democratic leaderships to stay longer in political o¢ ce. The relevance of this
mechanism is supported by recent evidence in Wright et al. (2012) who, using di¤erent variants
of the logit model and a di¤erent denition of leadership survival than we do, document that oil
wealth positively a¤ects the likelihood that autocratic leaderships remain in power.
Our approach di¤ers from the papers reviewed above along several dimensions. First, we
interpret leadership duration di¤erently. While Cuaresma et al. (2011), Ross (2008), and Omgba
(2009) all analyze the duration of individual leaders, our focus is on the duration of the political
party in power. Our duration variable is thus how many years the chief executives party has been
in o¢ ce.19 Second, we include di¤erent types of natural resources to allow for the possibility
that technically appropriable (or lootable) and non-technically appropriable (or non-lootable)
resources a¤ect duration di¤erently. We also address potential endogeneity problems in the
regression analysis by employing predetermined oil production volumes and proven oil reserves
rather than contemporaneous oil rents. Third, we incorporate a larger number of countries and
split the data into subgroups according to institutional, constitutional and/or regime di¤erences.
Since countries di¤er so dramatically along these dimensions, we consider it naïve to assume
that the natural resource variables will have the same e¤ect on duration across di¤erent group
of countries. Therefore we control for institutional, constitutional, and/or regime characteristics
in some specications and analyze each subgroup separately in others.
3 Data and empirical model
3.1 Leadership duration
To construct entry and exit of political parties in power, we use the Database on Political
Institutions, henceforth DPI (Beck et al., 2001; Keefer, 2007).20 The dependent variable in our
18Both Smith (2004) and Ulfelder (2007) rely on a binary dependent variable to identify democratic transitions.
19See Section 3 for details.
20The version of the DPI that we rely on here goes from 1975 to 2006, and covers all independent countries
with populations above 100.000.
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analysis is a binary one indicating whether the chief executives party is removed from power in
a given year.21 We consider a political change to have occurred when in the following year the
chief executive belongs to a di¤erent party.
There are several reasons why we prefer this denition of a LD. First, prime ministers in
a parliamentary systems have less power relative to the members of their respective parties
and coalitions. Moreover, in presidential systems there are usually rules regarding the number
of terms a president can serve. Hence, in many cases observing a change in a countrys chief
executive does not reect the incumbent partys loss in electoral support, but is more the result
of constitutional rules or party preferences.22 Therefore we believe that in democratic polities
it is more appropriate to look at the dominant political partys duration in o¢ ce, rather than
relying on the duration in o¢ ce of their individual leaders.
Second, political parties are often regionally or ethnically oriented. This might cause groups
within a population to benet at the expense of others if the party that represents their region
or their ethnic group is in o¢ ce.23
Finally, in non-democratic contexts, looking at individual leaders term in o¢ ce might be
problematic if we want to determine the e¤ect of natural resource income on LD. For instance,
when Raúl Castro assumed the duties of President of the Council of State in Cuba due to
his brother Fidel Castros illness, we believe that this did not represent a transition that can be
explained by economic factors. According to the denitions in previous studies (e.g., in Cuaresma
et al. 2011, Ross 2008, and Omgba 2009) this transition would be considered the end of a LD
in Cuba, while according to our denition the end of a LD in Cuba would take place when the
chief executive no longer belongs to the communist party (i.e., the Partido Comunista de Cuba,
PCC).24
There are changes in chief executive within the same party that perhaps represent a change
in leadership that is due to an individuals leadership style or particular economic conditions.25
So we are aware that our classication of leadership change is not perfect in all cases, but we
believe that it is superior to ignoring the political parties of the leaders holding o¢ ce and instead
21For the complete list of variable denitions and sources, see the online Data appendix at:
http://www.bi.edu/research/academic-homepage/?ansattid=a0810301.
22See Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) for a discussion along these lines.
23Consider for example the case of Sierra Leone, where the Sierra Leone Peoples Party gets its support from
the south and east and the Mende ethnic group. Its main opponents, the All Peoples Congress Party, gets its
support from the north and west and the Temne ethnic group (Robinson and Torvik, 2008). According to our
denition it would not have been a leadership change in Sierra Leone in 2007 if Sierra Leone Peoples Party
candidate Solomon Berewa had defeated the All Peoples Congress Party candidate Ernest Bai Koroma although
it would have been a change of president (from Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to Solomon Berewa).
24Other example of a non-democratic change in chief executive that according to our denition do not represent
a leadership change includes when Ismail Omar Guelleh succeeded his uncle Hassan Gouled Aptidon on May 8,
1999 in Djibouti when his uncle retired and when Daniel arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta after his death on
August 22, 1978 in Kenya. According to our denition, a leadership change did not occur in Kenya until Kenya
African National Unions (KANU) candidate Uhuru Kenyatta was defeated by Mwai Kibaki and thus ending nearly
40 years of post-independence KANU rule.
25For example, in Paraguay in 1989, February 2, to the surprise of many, and with the backing of the United
States, Rodríguez launched a coup against Stroessner. The coup quickly succeeded, with Stroessner eeing the
country within days (Mora, 1998). Both Stroessner and Rodríguez belonged to the Colorado Party, and hence
this episode does not qualify as a leadership change according to our denition.
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regarding only individual leaders. There are also cases where the chief executive is not associated
with a specic party, but is an independent candidate, a military leader, or a hereditary king. In
these cases we have no choice but to use their individual term in o¢ ce as our duration variable.
In our data, the observed period referring to a LD is the date that the chief executives party
rose to power, for which the duration in o¢ ce is indexed in the DPI. In duration (or survival)
models, the process observed may have begun at di¤erent dates for various parties present in
the sample. By construction, the observations are brought back to January 1 of each year. We
restrict our attention to regimes that started in 1975 or later. The year 2006 marks the end of all
observation periods. To construct a LD, we primarily use the variable PRTYIN from DPI. The
variable PRTYIN is how long the chief executives party has been in o¢ ce. Years are counted
when the party of the chief executive was in power as of January 1 or was elected but had not
yet taken o¢ ce as of January 1. If a country made a transition from being colony to being
an independent nation, the leadership tenure is dated to start at independence. The variable
PRTYIN is missing if there are no political parties, if the chief executive is independent of party
a¢ liation, or if the party is the army in the case of a military regime. In these cases we use
the variable YRSOFFC to construct the LDs. YRSOFFC refers to how many years the chief
executive (not party of chief executive) has been in o¢ ce.
3.2 Natural resources variables
The natural resource measures that we employ correspond to oil, diamonds, and minerals.
Information on oil production and prices are from the World Banks Adjusted Net Savings (ANS)
dataset. Our main oil variable, Oil, is oil income as percentage of GDP (GDP data is from World
Development Indicators, henceforth WDI).26
In some specications oil income is measured per capita instead of as percentage of GDP (Oil
per capita). We also use alternative variables for oil revenues in order to minimize the potential
endogeneity of oil extraction. There is always a concern that some political leaders extract more
oil for political reasons, and that any relationship between oil income and duration might partly
capture this endogenous e¤ect. Therefore in some specications we use production volume from
the year prior to the start of a new leadership tenure instead of current oil production. The
variable Oil last failure is equal to oil production the year prior to the start of the current
leadership, times the current oil price, and measured as percentage of current GDP. We also use
oil production in 1970 (the WBs Adjusted net savings dataset starts in 1970) instead of current
oil production, and Oil 1970 is equal to oil production in 1970 times the current oil price, also
measured as percentage of current GDP. Finally we employ proven oil reserves per capita (Oil
reserves) as robustness check on the other oil variables (data on proven oil reserves are from
EIA).
26Oil income equals oil production multiplied by oil price. Oil production is oil production volume in tons.
Missing values are replaced by zero if the country does not produce oil domestically. We have consulted Petrodata
(Lulia et al., 2007), Energy Information Administration (EIA), and BP Statistical Review of World Energy June
2008.
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The Minerals variable is from the WDI and equals the product of unit resource rents and
the physical quantities of minerals extracted as a percentage in GNI. The minerals included are
bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, and silver.
The information on diamonds and classication into lootable diamonds and non-lootable
diamonds are from the Gilmore et al. (2005) dataset which o¤ers a comprehensive list of all
known diamond deposits throughout the world. In our analysis, the variable Lootable Diamonds
is a dummy variable for the existence of lootable diamond deposits with known production,
and the variable Non-lootable Diamonds is a dummy variable for the existence of non-lootable
diamond deposits with known production.
3.3 Institutions
We use several di¤erent institutional variables to classify the LDs into di¤erent polity types
and institutional subcategories. Our baseline polity type split is based on the POLITY score
the year before the leadership tenure started (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). We categorize as
Democraticthose LDs with a POLITY score greater than 5 when last leadership ended. The
LDs are categorized as Intermediateif they have a POLITY score between 5 and 5 when last
leadership ended. Finally, LDs with a POLITY score lower than -5 when last leadership ended
are categorized as Autocratic.
The POLITY score is compounded of ve subindices, of which two have been argued to reect
the level of violent conict in society (Vreeland 2008). Hence, the use of this index to categorize
the LDs could potentially reect one of the proposed mechanisms relating the natural resource
variables to political survival. In order to check whether our results are driven by endogenous LD
categorization, we employ two alternative institutional variables that are robust to this critique.
First, we employ the combined index proposed by Vreeland (2008) called the X-POLITY index,
which is compounded by three of the subindices in the POLITY index: XCONST, XRCOMP,
and XROPEN (see the Web appendix in Vreeland, 2008, for details). Second, we employ the
XCONST index, since this is the most used institutional subindex of the POLITY IV indices
and has the straightforward interpretation of decision rules that constrain the political actions of
the chief executive (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). With respect to the X-POLITY index, which
has the range [-6,7], we employ the wide threshold prescribed by Vreeland (2008) in order to
categorize the LDs, which correspond to -3 and 4 on the X-POLITY index.27 With respect to
the XCONST index, which has the range [-3,4], we use the thresholds -1 and 2, as proposed by
Vreeland (2008).
In addition to dividing the LDs into polity types based on the institutional indices described
above, we also use the three institutional indices as separate controls in the respective regressions,
and in some regressions also in interaction with the resource variables. We continue using the
polity scores prior to the entry of the LDs in order to reduce problems with endogeneity. To
27We have also experimented with the range [-2,3], however, this implied too few observations in the intermediate
category to make meaningful inference.
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facilitate interpretation of the estimates, we normalize all the indices to the range [0,1] and
rename these normalized indices to Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1], and Xconst[0,1], respectively.28
We further classify the democratic LDs according to their constitutions, as either presidential
form of government (Presidential) or parliamentary form of government (Parliamentary), and
as majoritarian (Majoritarian) or proportional electoral systems (Proportional). Finally, the
autocratic regimes are classied into Single party regimes, Personal rule, Military regimes and
Monarchies. Notice that all LDs are classied according to the regime type they were character-
ized by at entry (i.e., upon taking power). This is done to avoid endogeneity in the classication
due to potential e¤ects the resource variables might have on the institutional variables. So if,
for instance, the political leadership changed character from being a parliamentary to being a
presidential system, or from being a military regime to being a single-party regime within one
LD, the whole leadership tenure is classied as a parliamentary or a military regime.
3.4 Control variables
It has been argued that political stability, and therefore the duration of political leadership,
depends on the economic environment in which the leader acts (Lipset 1960). In our baseline
specications we always include (log of) GDP per capita (GDP per capita), the growth rate
of GDP (Economic growth), and the age-dependency ratio (Dependency ratio) as variables to
capture the countrys economic and demographic environment.
The development of sound economic conditions is often associated with the size of a country.
The literature on the viability of countries tends to nd that large countries are sustainable
in economic terms (Robinson 1960). On the other hand, governability of countries seems to
become more di¢ cult in large countries (Cuaresma et al. 2011). We include (log of) population
(Population) as a proxy for country size.
In some specications, we also include a set of economic policy variables (depending on
data availability): Govt exp., Education exp., Ination, and Trade (from WDI). For democratic
regimes, we include several controls for the political environment in which the leadership operates,
including a dummy variable indicating if the political leadership controls all legislative houses
when it assumes power (Exec0s party all houses); party fractionalization in the legislature when
it enters power (Party fract. in legislature); the number of years left in the chief executives
current term before a new election must be called (Years left in current term) (all based on
WDI). Additionally, we include a variable for the age of democracy (Democratic age), which is
the fraction of years between 1800 and 2006 the country has been an uninterrupted democracy,
given that the country was also an independent nation (uninterrupted democracy means an
uninterrupted string of positive yearly values of the variable polity IV until the end of the
sample). Hence if a country has had an uninterrupted string of positive yearly values of the
28We have also experimented with the Polcon index (Henisz, 2002) as an alternative measure of institutional
constraints on the executive. The results were very similar as with the other three indices and are not reported
in the text. The results from using the Polcon index can be made available upon request.
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Polity score from 1800 to 2006 they get a rating of one, and if a country does not have a positive
value of the POLITY in 2006 it gets a rating of zero.
3.5 Nelson-Aalen hazard estimates
There is a wide variety of survival models to choose from, and the choice of empirical model
generally depends on the properties of the data. In order to assess the properties of our data, we
rst estimate the (Nelson-Aalen) hazard function for the full sample and examine its properties
graphically.29 Figure 1 in the Introduction graphs the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for the
whole sample of LDs, and distinguishes between those where oil production as a percent of GDP
is 1 percent or more at the onset of the LD (OilRich=1), and those less dependent on oil
(OilRich=0). In order to assess the monotonicity of the underlying hazard function, we graph
in Figure 2 the corresponding Nelson-Aalen (smoothed) hazard function.
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Notes:
The graph plots a smoothed estimate of the (Nelson-Aalen) hazard function,
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 2.
OilRich indicates a gross production value of oil in GDP > the baseline sample mean.
Baseline sample, 1975-2006
Oil and the Political Hazard Rate
Figure 2: Oil and the political hazard rate in the baseline sample.
The graph indicates a non-monotonic baseline hazard function, where the hazard rate is rst
increasing and then decreasing, both for the oil intensive and non-oil intensive LDs.
As reviewed in Section 2, the political economy of oil is likely to depend on the level of
democracy. In gures 3 and 4, we break the sample into democratic and non-democratic polity
types (based on the POLITY index, as discussed in Section 3.3).
29The Nelson-Aalen hazard function is estimated using the following estimator, bh (t) = b 1 DP
j=1
Kt bH (tj),
where  bH (tj) = bH (tj)  bH (tj 1), bH (tj) = P
jjtjt
dj
nj
, and nj is the number at risk at time tj , dj is the number
of failures at tj , and the sum is over all distinct failure times less than or equal to t. The variable Kt refers
to the kernel function and b is the bandwidth of the kernel smoother. The specic choice of kernel smoother is
not essential for the general empirical pattern; in the gures, we employ the Gaussian kernel smoother but we
have also experimented with the Epanechnikov kernel smoother, and with a bandwidth that minimizes the mean
integrated square error of a Gaussian distribution.
16
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
0 5 10 15 20
Years in political office
OilRich = 0 OilRich = 1
Notes:
The graph plots a smoothed estimate of the (Nelson-Aalen) hazard function,
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel, bandwidth 2.
OilRich indicates a gross production value of oil in GDP > the baseline sample mean.
Democratic polities, 1975-2006
Oil and the Political Hazard Rate
Figure 3: Oil and the political hazard rate in democratic polities.
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Figure 4: Oil and the political hazard rate in non-democratic polities.
The graphs in gures 3 and 4 are suggestive that the e¤ect of oil may depend on level of
democracy, and we investigate this institutional dependency in much more detail below. Here,
our primary interest is in the properties of the hazard function, and the gures are indicative of a
hazard rate that rst increases and then decreases, independent of institutional categorization.30
Thus, the probability of the current government or the chief executive being ousted appears to
be relatively low immediately after an election (or after a non-democratic transition of executive
power), then it increases, and nally it decreases for governments and executives that succeed in
staying in power for a su¢ ciently long period of time.
30Section 3.6 investigates the properties of the survival function more rigorously.
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3.6 Model selection and the log-normal survival model
Several classes of survival models are consistent with the hazard functions graphed out in Fig-
ures 24, such as the semi-parametric Cox model and a variety of parametric survival models.
Given that the proper distributional assumptions are made, parametric analysis is more e¢ cient
than non-parametric- or semi-parametric models because prospective periods without leadership
failures are also informative (Cleves et al., 2002). Hence, if a parametric survival model can be
robustly tted to the data, such a model is preferred over semi-parametric and nonparametric
models.
We base our choice of parametric survival model on the Akaike (AIC) and the Bayesian
Information Criteria (BIC), where lower test values indicate a better t to the data.31 The test
results are consistent with our interpretation of the graphed hazard functions in Figures 13,
and indicate that the non-monotonic survival models (i.e. the log-logistic, the log-normal, and
the gamma models) are associated with lower values of the AIC and the BIC statistics than the
monotonic models.32 Additionally, the log-normal model performs better than the log-logistic
model, and weakly better than the gamma model. Employing the law of parsimony, the log-
normal model is preferred over the gamma model since it relies on fewer parameters. In the
continuation, we thus base our main inference on the log-normal survival model, and employ the
other models as robustness checks on the main specication.
To facilitate interpretation of the parameter estimates displayed in the ensuing tables, consider
the following, simple representation of the log-normal survival model,
 j = e
 xjtj ; (1)
where  j~Lognormal (0; ), and where tj is time at risk for the jth LD. The associated cumu-
lative distribution function is given by F (tj jxj) = 

ln tj (0+xj)


. We can thus express the
survival function as
S (tj jxj) = 1  

ln tj   (0 + xj)


: (2)
The parameter vector  can be interpreted by rearranging equation (1) such that
ln (tj) = 0 + xj + uj ; (3)
where uj~N (0; ). Using equation (3), we can express the expected time to failure as
E (tj jxj) = e0exj: (4)
In equation (4), the time to failure at the onset of a LD is equal to the product of the baseline
31The AIC is dened as AIC =  2ln(L) + 2k, while the BIC is BIC =  2ln(L) + ln(N)k. In both formulas,
L is the likelihood estimate, k is the models degrees of freedom, and N is the number of observations.
32The test results can be found in Table OA1 in the Online Appendix to Oil and Political Survival at:
http://www.bi.edu/research/academic-homepage/?ansattid=a0810301
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failure time, e0 , and the natural base e raised to the power of a linear combination of the vector
of regressors, xj. The term ek then has the simple interpretation of the time ratio of variable
xjk, and expresses the factor by which the time to failure shifts if there is a one unit change in
xjk, conditional on the characteristics xjk, and on the remaining parameters  k.
Some covariates may be time-varying within the LDs, while others may be constant. The
value of oil production, for example, vary both across and within LDs, while features of the
political institutions may be constant throughout. Whenever a time-varying covariate changes
within a LD, the change induces an acceleration (or deceleration) of the predicted remaining
time to failure, as indicated by the -estimate of that covariate. Notice that this feature has
consequences for the interpretation of the estimates of time-varying covariates. In particular, if
a covariate has an autoregressive lag-structure, the interpretation of its respective -coe¢ cient is
not straightforward, because one would need to take into account the endogenous adjustment of
that variable. In the case of our main oil variables this should, however, not constitute a major
concern. It is generally found in the literature that annual oil prices, and in particular within
the time window of the present analysis, approximate the properties of a random walk.33 Hence,
changes in the value of oil production which are induced by changes in the international price
of oil, should not be subject to autocorrelation, and hence should be interpreted as permanent,
rather than transitory, shocks.34
4 Results
4.1 Baseline regressions
Table 1 reports the results from employing the log-normal model on our preferred baseline sample
of up to 138 countries and 500 LDs that start in 1975 or later. Additionally, the table also reports
estimates based on the full sample with all available countries and LDs (152 countries, 617 LDs),
and on the sample of LDs that are excluded from the baseline sample due to data availability
(117 LDs from equally many countries).35
As discussed in Section 3.1, the baseline vector of explanatory variables contains four classes of
variables: natural resource variables, an index of institutional performance, economic variables,
and demographics. We introduce the explanatory variables successively, beginning with our
33See, e.g., Kline (2008), Hamilton (2008) and Acemoglu et.al. (2008).
34Our baseline specication employs current value of oil production as percentage in GDP as the main oil
variable. Hence, some of the variation in this variable will be attributed to variation in the levels of oil production
and GDP. Although oil prices, due to their volatile nature, constitute the main source of variation in our baseline
oil variable, the variable may be autocorrelated due to the inuence of the other components, which could a¤ect
the interpretation of the associated time ratio estimates. To address this issue, as well as other potential sources
of biases, we experiment with alternative operationalizations of the oil intensity variable in which the within
LD variation in the oil measure is exclusively derived from uctuations in the oil price. The results from these
robustness exercises are presented and discussed in Section 5.
35As discussed in Section 3.1, our preferred empirical identication strategy implies conditioning on initial
conditions, which constrains the baseline sample to include LDs starting no earlier than 1975 and onwards. We
discuss the robustness of our main results with regard to model choice in Section 5.
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primary variable of interest, the value of oil production in GDP.
[Table 1 about here]
Column 1 in Table 1 reports the time ratio estimate of the value of oil production in GDP,
Oil, when all other covariates are excluded. The time ratio estimate of Oil of 1.011 is signicant
at the 10 percent level, implying that a 1-percentage point increase in the value of oil production
in GDP is associated with an average increase in the duration of the current political leadership
of 1.1 percent. Notice that the magnitude of this estimate is substantial: the estimate suggests
that a random LD increasing its value of oil production in GDP by one standard deviation (13.95
percent in GDP) is expected to increase its time to failure by 16.5 percent, which amounts to
roughly 10 months at the onset of the LD (from 4.95 to 5.77 years).36
We introduce the battery of baseline controls successively in columns (2)(5) of Table 1.
Notably, the estimate of Oil remains stable in the range 1.0111.012 throughout. If anything,
adding more controls makes the e¤ect of oil in GDP stronger, both in terms of its time ratio
estimate and in terms of statistical signicance (in column (5), the p-value of the Oil variable is
.007; not reported in the table). We interpret this as an indication that the e¤ect of Oil does
not appear to be signicantly confounded with any of the included covariates.
In column (2), additional natural resource measures are added to the specication to inves-
tigate whether there is a distinction between resource value and resource type. The variable
Minerals measures the net value of mineral production (net of production costs), as a percentage
in GDP. As minerals commonly are classied as technically appropriable as opposed to, for
example, oil and non-lootable diamonds, we might expect this variable and the dummy variable
Lootable Diamonds, to be associated with shorter LDs. The estimates in tables (2)(5) provide
some support for the hypothesis that technically appropriable natural resources are associated
with shorter durations than the mean, and vice versa: Minerals are associated with time ratio
estimates that are smaller than one throughout, while the time ratio estimates of Non-lootable Di-
amonds are in all regressions larger than one. Both Minerals and Non-lootable Diamonds are
signicant at the 10 percent level in Column (5), which is the most demanding regression in the
baseline sample in Table 1. The variable Lootable Diamonds, however, is never signicant, and
its e¤ect can hence not be separated from the excluded category of LDs without any diamonds.
The regressions in Columns (3)(5) employ the baseline set of control variables. The only
two variables which are statistically signicant in the regressions are per capita growth, Eco-
nomic growth, and the log of the population size, Population. When the chief executives party
experiences a higher rate of economic growth, the expected time to failure increases. Addition-
ally, LDs in a country with a larger population size are more frequently replaced. However,
neither the polity score (Polity[0,1]), the level of GDP per capita (GDP per capita), or the
demographic composition (Dependency ratio) are associated with statistically signicant e¤ects.
The regressions in columns (3)(5) thus suggest that several of the control variables, and perhaps
36The time ratio is calculated as (1.011)13:95 1.165, which further translates into time (months) as follows:
4.950.165129.80.
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most notably the level of income and the democratic performance, appear inessential for political
leadership survival. As will be shown below, however, these aggregated patterns hide heteroge-
nous, nonlinear e¤ects across the di¤erent polity types, suggesting that the baseline controls are
still relevant. Moreover, the inclusion of the baseline set of controls in the regressions in Table 1
do indeed increase the overall explanatory power of the model, by increasing the log-likelihood
by some 67 percent (from  -580 to  -545, comparing Column (2) and (5)).
4.2 Sampling and censoring
The oil variables from the ANS dataset dates back to 1970, while the DPI, from which we
construct the LDs and most of our political and institutional covariates, dates back to 1975.
This e¤ectively constrains our preferred baseline sample to the 19752006 period. This, however,
also introduces a potential selection problem. In particular, one might worry that our selected
baseline sample introduces a systematic bias due to a systematic correlation between the survival
times in political o¢ ce and the oil intensity of the excluded LDs. Indeed, from the summary
statistic in Table A1, it is clear that the excluded LDs are associated with both a higher value of
oil in GDP, as well as a longer survival time, than the corresponding mean values. Thus, based
on the summary statistic in Table A1, one might expect the baseline time ratio estimates of Oil
to be downward biased (towards a time ratio estimate of one).
The regressions reported in columns (6)(11) in Table 1 assess the severity of this potential
selection problem. Columns (6)(8) report regression results on the full sample, which also
includes the LDs which began prior to 1975. Additionally, columns (9)(11) report the results
from exclusively employing the sample of LDs that are excluded from our baseline sample. The
number of LDs excluded is between 106117 (one LD per country), depending on the number of
controls included in the regression model. The regression results indicate that, if anything, and
as expected, the baseline regressions are likely to underestimate the true time ratio parameter
associated with the Oil variable: In all but one regression (Column (11)), the time ratio estimates
in the full and excluded samples are higher than in the baseline sample. In the continuation,
when we base our inference exclusively on the baseline sample, the time ratio estimates should
thus be interpreted with this potential downward selection bias in mind.
Restricting the sample to LDs which begin in 1975 or later implies that we avoid problems
of left-censoring, since our dataset is complete with regard to the onset of all LDs included. For
the same reason of completeness, interval censoring is also not a concern. For the observations
that are right-censored, meaning all LDs which end after 2006, the censored failure times are
mechanically replaced by the estimated survival function, which should not constitute a source
of bias as long as the censoring is not correlated with our covariates of interest.37
37The statistical software package (Stata/SE version 12.0) performs this substitution by default. Although
censoring might not be a concern, truncation could potentially be, due to the relatively few 14-15 countries in
which we never observe a political failure. In particular, this would be a concern if the properties of the underlying
survival function are di¤erent for these countries/LDs, and if these properties are correlated with Oil. In this
specic case, the correlation would necessarily be positive, implying that the time ratio estimates of Oil in columns
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4.3 Institutional nonlinearities
Our ndings so far indicate that oil in particular, but also diamonds and mineral production,
are systematically associated with political partiesduration in o¢ ce. As discussed in the In-
troduction and in the Literature review, however, the resource e¤ects are likely to depend on
the overall quality of the democratic institutions. In this section, we investigate this possibility
by interacting the resource variables with the di¤erent indices of the level of democracy and the
constraints on the executive. As discussed in Section 3.1, we use the polity scores prior to the
onset of a LD rather than current polity scores. This is to avoid that the institutional variables
we condition the resource e¤ects on are inuenced by endogenous responses by the current po-
litical regime to the resource environment, which would systematically bias our estimates of the
resource e¤ects.
In Table 2 we report the results from employing the three normalized institutional variables
Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1], and Xconst[0,1] in separate regressions. First, we employ the three
indices in interaction with the resource variables (indicated by Scalein the table), and, second,
we use the three indices to construct an indicator for LDs that were non-democratic at the onset
(Nondem=1 if non-democratic, Nondem=0 if democratic) which we, in turn, interact with the
resource measures (indicated by Nondemin the table).
The results in Table 2 are strongly suggestive that the resource e¤ects are contingent on the
inherited level of democracy and constraints on the executive. The value of oil production in
GDP is a statistically signicant determinant of political survival whenever the level of democracy
and the constraints on the executive were low at the onset of the LD, i.e., when the values
of Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1], and Xconst[0,1] are close to zero, or when Nondem=1. Since the
estimated interaction e¤ects are negative (with regression estimates lower than one), the resource
e¤ects are smaller the more democratic are the institutions, or, for the Xconst[0,1] index, the
more institutionally constrained is the executive. The estimates are indicative that the e¤ect of
Oil completely disappears if the institutional performance is at the maximum, that is, when any
of Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1], and Xconst[0,1] are equal to one. Similarly, the e¤ect is close to zero
when the Nondem indicator is turned o¤ (i.e. when Nondem=0).
The results appear robust to the set of included controls. Considering the full specications
in Columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9), the time ratio estimates on Oil range from 1.015 to
1.026. This implies that for the LDs with the lowest scores on any of the three indices (= 0), a
one standard deviation increase in Oil gives an increase in the expected duration of the political
leadership of between 13.7 and 25.6 months. Hence, according to these estimates, Oil exerts
a positive and signicant e¤ect on the survival in political o¢ ce if the LD is su¢ ciently non-
democratic at the onset.
With regard to the three additional resource measures, we nd signicant e¤ects only for
(6)(11) are downward biased. Again, this would, if anything, imply a downward bias in our baseline estimates.
Since the sample of truncated LDs constitutes at most 2-3% (1415 out of 571617 LDs) of the full sample, the
extent of downward bias, if any, is likely inessential.
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minerals. As with oil, the e¤ects of minerals seem to depend on institutional performance; the
estimates suggest that only those LDs with the worst set of democratic institutions are a¤ected.
However, the results in Table 2 suggest that the e¤ect of minerals is opposite to the e¤ect of oil
in the sense that mineral incomes tend to shorten, rather than lengthen, the expected duration
in political o¢ ce. The time ratio estimates on Minerals for the least democratic LDs are in the
range 0.862 to 0.915, which implies that a one standard deviation increase in Minerals gives a
reduction in the expected time to failure of between 17.3 and 11.1 months, respectively. The
negative e¤ect of mineral rents is thus also substantial.
The results in Table 2 are in line with existing evidence (Omgba 2008) showing that it is
only oil, and not other minerals, that prolongs the duration of state leaders in Africa. One
possible explanation for this result, according to Omgba (2008), is that oil requires massive
nancial investment and considerable production technology. To ensure the protability of these
investments, investors are tempted to give their support to political leaders with whom the
contracts were initially negotiated, thereby reducing the risk of losing the property rights that
may accompany a change in leadership. Omgba (2008) also highlights that the tensions on the
international oil market have global repercussions, adding a strategic aspect that other mining
products do not have. Of course these mechanisms might also be driving some of the results in
our sample, and might explain why Oil always is associated with a statistically and economically
signicant e¤ect on the duration in political o¢ ce among the non-democratic polities.
Taken together, the evidence in Table 2 strongly suggests that the political economy of
natural resources is dependent on the polity type as identied by the level of the democratic
institutions and the constraints on the executive. There is evidence that oil exerts a positive e¤ect
and minerals a negative e¤ect on political survival if the LDs are non-democratic at the onset.
Moreover, the e¤ects are weaker the more democratic is the institutions, and even completely
vanishes for the most democratic polities.
A potential weakness with the way we explore institutional nonlinearities in the regressions
in Table 2, is that we do not allow also other economic, political, and demographic variables to
have di¤erent e¤ects depending on the overall performance of the (inherited) set of democratic
institutions. In the next sections we therefore investigate institutional nonlinearities by allowing
the parameters of all of the included set of resource variables and controls to vary by polity type.
In particular, we divide the LDs into three categories based on the democratic institutions and
the constraints on the executive prior to the onset of the LDs.38
4.4 Democratic polities
The above results indicate that the levels of oil and mineral income do not matter for political
survival in the sample of democratic LDs. In the regressions reported in Table 3, we investigate
these e¤ects in more detail on di¤erent samples of democratic LDs, as categorized by the three
institutional indices Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1], and Xconst[0,1]. In addition, we control for a
38The institutional categorization is detailed out in Section 3.3.
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number of political, institutional and economic variables that are either specic to democratic
polities, or that are only available for this category of LDs.
[Table 3 about here]
The main message to take away from Table 3 is that adding more controls does not materially
a¤ect the estimate of the Oil variable. With the exception of Column (3), Oil remains not
statistically signicant throughout if anything, Oil is associated with a negative e¤ect. Hence,
oil income appears unrelated to political survival in the democratic polities. Turning to the other
resource variables, the positive e¤ect of Lootable Diamonds that appeared in Table 2 is not robust
to the inclusion of additional economic and policy variables in Columns (4)(6). Minerals, on the
other hand, is only signicant when the additional economic and policy variables are included.
The few statistically signicant e¤ects of Lootable Diamonds and Minerals that we occasionally
observe in Table 3 are thus not empirically robust and most likely reect the inuence of outlying
observations in single regressions in specic subsamples.
The non-e¤ect of the natural resource variables could in principle be a result of the model
specication however this is not likely to be the case. First, the model is indeed capable
of capturing the e¤ects of other covariates, which a¤ect the duration in political o¢ ce in the
expected ways. For example, institutional quality exerts a negative e¤ect on duration throughout
the regressions; in better democracies the duration in o¢ ce is on average shorter. Moreover, the
more years a leader has left of his current term in o¢ ce, the longer is the expected survival in
o¢ ce of his/her political party. Also, not surprisingly, the expected duration in political o¢ ce is
higher in presidential forms of governments.39 Finally, if the executives party controls all houses
the expected duration in political o¢ ce is longer, while party fractionalization in the legislative
bodies is negative for political survival. The age of a democracy and the electoral system are
never signicant. The remaining economic and political variables (estimates not reported in the
table) are, for the most part, not signicant.
In columns (6) through (8), we employ a specication where we control for the average dura-
tion (Average Duration) of the LDs in a country. Including a measure of the average leadership
duration in the country will proxy for the e¤ects of all variables observables and unobservables
that might be omitted from the regression specications and that correlate with the duration
in o¢ ce of political leaderships. If the natural resource endowments a¤ect political survival via
predetermined (to the current political leadership) institutions and regime types, the e¤ect of
the resource variables should, if anything, be downward biased when controlling for observed and
predetermined institutional characteristics/regime types and/or the average duration measure.
As expected, the Average duration variable is highly signicant and positively correlated with
the survival in political o¢ ce, indicating that there are country specic e¤ects (variables), not
captured by our included resource variables and the set of baseline controls, that are positively
associated with the expected duration in o¢ ce of the political leaderships. With the exception
39The nding that presidential regimes have a stronger tendency to political deadlock and longer durations is
consistent with key insights in the literature, as argued by, e.g., Cheibub et al. (2002), and, in a more recent
theory contribution, Robinson and Torvik (2008).
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of Lootable diamonds that occasionally have a positive and statistically signicant time ratio
estimate, the resource variables remain statistically insignicant throughout.
In conclusion, the regressions reported in Table 3 conrm that most of the constitutional-
and contextual variables that are being added successively into the specications are robust
determinants of political survival in democratic polities, with the expected e¤ects. However, the
introduction of these variables have virtually no e¤ect on the estimate of our main variable of
interest: the time ratio estimate Oil is relatively stable and statistically insignicant throughout.
4.5 Intermediate polities
The nonlinear e¤ects of oil and minerals documented in Table 2 suggest that the resource variables
may a¤ect political survival not only in the least democratic LDs, but also among the polities
with intermediate scores on the polity and constraints on the executive indices. In this section
we investigate in more detail the e¤ect of the resource variables on the subsample of intermedi-
ate LDs, which amounts to 98 LDs, 72 failures and 56 countries when employing the POLITY
categorization, and 112 LDs, 80 failures and 59 countries when employing the X-POLITY cate-
gorization.40 By our categorizations, compared to democratic polities the intermediate polities
su¤er from worse overall democratic performance at the onset of the LDs. Democratic perfor-
mance also correlates with economic performance, as indicated in Table A1, and the intermediate
LDs are the poorest performing economies in our sample. In the sample of intermediate LDs the
level of real GDP per capita is about one-eighth of the level in the democratic LDs, and one-
fourth the level found in the autocratic LDs. As the availability and quality of macro data often
is associated with economic performance, the potential vector of controls that can be applied in
the intermediate regressions is strongly limited. However, some additional controls are available,
and in Table 4 we add these successively to the baseline specication.
In Table 4, rst notice that the baseline specication in column (1) suggests strong and
statistically signicant e¤ects of all resource variables. Moreover, the e¤ects on political sur-
vival are in accordance with our priors: the least technically appropriable resources (Oil and
Non-lootable Diamonds) are associated with positive e¤ects; the more technically appropriable
resources (Lootable Diamonds and Minerals) are associated with negative e¤ects. Adding addi-
tional controls for openness to trade, the size of government adds little to the explanatory power
of the model (the Log pseudolikelihood increases by some 34 percent) and the resource e¤ects
remain relatively stable throughout.
Because the available set of controls is quite limited for the intermediate category of LDs,
one may worry that the resource e¤ects reect omitted country specic variables. Moreover, the
omitted variables may even be inuenced by the resource measures. For example, oil may a¤ect
the political regime type, which in turn a¤ects the expected duration in o¢ ce of the parties of the
chief executives. In order to address this concern, we control for the average duration in o¢ ce of
40Notice that the regressions when employing the XCONST categorization and the baseline specication did
not converge in the intermediate sample.
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a political leadership in the countries. Since the average duration in o¢ ce of a political leadership
may correlate with oil, we might expect the time ratio estimates on the resource variables to
be downward biased when including the Average Duration variable in the regression. However,
considering the time ratio estimates on the resource variables in columns (4) and (5) there is
little, if any, indication that this type of endogeneity is driving our results. That is, even when
controlling for Average Duration, the time ratio estimates on the resource variables remain quite
stable throughout; the only exception is Lootable Diamonds, suggesting that the e¤ect of this
variable may be confounded with omitted, country specic variables. We thus conclude that with
the possible exception of Lootable Diamonds the time ratio estimates of the resource variables in
Table 4 not likely reect unobserved country specic factors excluded from the empirical model.
To sum up our ndings for the intermediate polities, we nd that natural resource wealth
appears to exert a strong e¤ect on political survival. Moreover, the resource type also appears to
matter. Oil is the most robust determinant and is associated with longer durations in political
o¢ ce, while lootable diamonds and minerals are associated with shorter durations.
4.6 Autocratic polities
Among the three polity categories, the subsample of autocratic polities is the smallest and
consists of up to 77 LDs with the POLITY categorization, only 21 LDs with the X-POLITY
categorizations, and 72 LDs with the XCONST categorization. As with the two other categories
of LDs, we investigate the robustness of the Table 2 regressions by running separate regressions
for the autocratic LDs, and by adding more controls. In particular, we account for regime
heterogeneity by including indicators for di¤erent types of autocratic regimes: Personal rule,
Military regime, Single party regime, and Monarchy.
As in the previous two tables, the rst column in Table 5, column (1), constitutes the baseline
specication. Only Oil and Minerals are statistically signicant with the expected e¤ects in the
baseline regression, however, also the diamonds variables have the expected signs. In Column
(2) of Table 5 we add two additional economic controls (trade and ination) and two policy
controls (the size of government, and expenditures spent on education, both measured relative to
GDP). Neither of these variables are statistically signicant, but their inclusion increases the log
pseudolikelihood statistics from -103.2 to -72.3. However, little happens to the natural resource
estimates of interest; the time ratio estimate ofMinerals drops just short of statistical signicance
(with a p-value of 0.13; not reported in the table), and the signicance, both economically and
statistically, of Oil is higher when the additional controls are included. The time ratio estimate
for Oil increases from 1.029 to 1.047 (with an associated p-value of 0.025; not reported in the
table).
We further proceed by investigating the e¤ect of regime type as classied by Geddes (1999).41
In columns (3) - (6), we include the di¤erent regime indicators separately and nd that all
41See Online Appendix: http://www.bi.edu/research/academic-homepage/?ansattid=a0810301 for details
about regime classications.
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except Personal rule have strong explanatory power. We nd that Single party regime and
Monarchy is associated with longer political durations, and Military regime is associated with
shorter durations. A similar pattern emerges when including any combination of three of the
four regime types in the regressions (with the fourth regime type being the default category); we
hence do not report these results. Importantly, regime type appear to be strongly associated with
political survival. Moreover, including indicators for regime type in the regressions reduces the
e¤ects of the resource measures, both with respect to the time ratio estimates and with respect
to statistical signicance.
The results when controlling for autocratic regime types suggest that the e¤ect of the resource
variables cannot be statistically separated from the e¤ect of the regime indicators. Notice,
however, that since the autocratic regime types themselves may be endogenous in the regressions,
these regressions should not be given a causal interpretation. For example, if one mechanism by
which oil, or other natural resources, a¤ect political survival in autocracies is by facilitating the
survival of monarchies or single party regimes, or if oil destabilizes the political leadership by
facilitating military dictatorship both of which would be consistent with our ndings then the
estimated e¤ect of Oil in these regressions would potentially be strongly biased towards zero. In
this case, the estimates in columns (1) and (2), which exlude the potentially endogenous regime
indicators, would be closer to the true e¤ect of the resource variables.
As in the intermediate sample, we introduce, in Column (7), the variable Average Duration to
account for potential omitted, country-specic factors. The time ratio estimate of Average Du-
ration is positive and highly signicant (with p-values in some of the regressions below .001; not
shown in table), indicating that, in the autocratic sample, variation in political survival among
the LDs is strongly correlated with unobserved heterogeneity at the country level. When in-
cluding the Average Duration variable together with any combination of three of the four regime
indicators, the Average Duration variable looses its statistical signicance and explanatory power
in the regressions (results not shown in the table). Moreover, the Average Duration variable is
strongly and positively correlated with Single party regime and Monarchy, and strongly nega-
tively correlated with Military regime, suggesting that Average Duration is indeed a good proxy
for these underlying institutional characteristics.42 Thus, the inclusion of the Average Duration
variable in columns (7)-(9) appears to e¤ectively control for regime heterogeneity. It is thus likely
that the Average Duration variable also captures any unobserved cross-country heterogeneity.
Interestingly, the time ratio estimate of Oil is still always positive, and even statistically sig-
nicant in one out of the three regressions (Column (9)) which include Average Duration, while
the e¤ect of Minerals is negative and statistically signicant in two out of the three regressions
(columns (7) and (8)). Thus, even when including our proxy for unobserved country specic
heterogeneity, Average Duration, the results indicate that Oil and Minerals are associated with
the expected e¤ects. Notice that for similar reasons as with the regime indicators, also the Aver-
age Duration variable is likely endogenous. However, even when controlling for Average Duration,
42The correlation coe¢ cients between Average Duration and Single party regime, Monarchy, and Military
regime in the autocratic subsample are 0.20, 0.45, and -0.30, respectively.
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the resource e¤ects have the expected signs, albeit weaker than in the baseline regressions.
In conclusion, the value of oil in GDP is strongly correlated with political survival in autocratic
polities, and the other resource variables also appear to have similar e¤ects (albeit not statistically
signicant) as in the intermediate sample. However, the e¤ects are strongly correlated with the
di¤erent autocratic regime types, and in particular with monarchies and single party regimes.
Hence, we cannot safely conclude whether it is the natural resource wealth, directly or indirectly
via the autocratic regime types, that have causal e¤ects for political survival, or whether it
is the regime types per se that causes the observed e¤ects. Given that the observed natural
resource e¤ects in the autocratic regimes are qualitatively similar to the e¤ects in the intermediate
polities, and that the resource e¤ects are strongest in the regressions that exlude the potentially
endogenous regime indicators and the Average Duration variable, the rst explanation seems
more plausible than the latter, but, again, the data alone do not allow us to draw this conclusion.
5 Robustness and extensions
5.1 Party versus chief executive
In Section 3.1 we argued that the duration in o¢ ce of the party of the chief executives is a better
measure of the continuation of political power than the duration in o¢ ce of the chief executive.
However, as we also discuss in Section 3.1, making this distinction is not always straightforward,
and in some situations following the chief executives duration may be the preferred choice.
To investigate the robustness of our results with regard to the choice of duration variable, we
reran our main regressions from Table 1, Column (5), and the rst columns in tables 35, but now
employing the duration in o¢ ce of the chief executive as the regressand. The results are reported
in Table 6, showing that the main results concerning the strong e¤ect of Oil and the institutional
nonlinearities remain. In columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) we also control for Average Duration, as
a proxy for country specic institutions and regime types. One di¤erence when using the chief
executive variable as regressand, however, is that Minerals and Non-lootable Diamonds appear
to be of less importance than when considering the party of the chief executive.43
5.2 Endogeneity in the Oil variable
The regressions reported in Tables 15 might not establish causality. First, any variable whether
political, policy, or economic is potentially endogenous as these are, at least to some extent,
determined in the same political equilibrium as our regressand. This empirical challenge is
di¢ cult to solve, and is inherent to most, if not all, empirical cross-country analyses in political
43One available intuition for this result, which is in line with our argument in Section 3.1, is that the chief
executives party better captures the duration of political power than the chief executives term in o¢ ce. Looking
at the intermediate LDs, the amount of durations is about 40 percent larger when employing chief executives
duration than when employing duration of the chief executives party, indicating a higher intraparty turnover of
chief executives within this category of LDs relative to the other categories.
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economy and political science. In the above regressions, we have employed predetermined, rather
than contemporaneous, measures of the political and institutional variables to reduce the severity
of this problem.
Second, the natural resource variables, and in particular the value of oil and minerals in
GDP, are potentially endogenous to political leaderships: a political leader with the ambition
to remain long in o¢ ce has a strong incentive to intensify the pace of resource exploration; a
farsighted leader also has an incentive to optimize the extraction path; a myopic leader has a
strong incentive to overextract resources in the short run. Additionally, the resource variables
may be subject to measurement errors. In this section we address this objection by replacing the
variable Oil with alternative and potentially more exogenous variables in the baseline regressions.
Table 7 shows the results from running the baseline regressions in the rst columns of tables
35, but with the alternative oil measures. First, we employ the variable Oil last failure, which
is similar to our main oil variable except that it is calculated using oil production volumes at the
time of the last leadership failure, rather than the contemporaneous production volumes. Since a
current leader cannot exert any inuence upon past production volumes, this variable is arguable
less likely to be subject to the type of endogeneity discussed above. The second alternative oil
variable in Table 7, Oil reserves, is a measure of the size of the proven oil reserves per capita,
which, we would argue, is the least endogenous of our oil variables; current leaders can only with
great di¢ culty, and a good deal of luck, have an impact on the amount of oil reserves available
under their leadership at best they may inuence upon the level of future reserves by investing
heavily in resource exploration. Finally, we employ a variable that is similar to our baseline oil
variable, Oil per capita, except that it measures the value of oil production per capita rather than
in GDP. The reason is that GDP in itself is potentially endogenous to the LDs; for example, a
political leader who illegitimately clings to power might be associated with both long durations
and bad economic outcomes, generating a positive correlation between our baseline oil variable
(which is denominated in GDP) and duration. Denominating the oil variable in the size of the
population, rather than GDP, eliminates this potential source of estimation bias.
The time ratio estimates in Table 7 are strongly supportive that our main results with re-
spect to the e¤ect of oil are robust. First, the oil variables have only very weak, and if anything
negative, e¤ects on political survival in the sample of democratic polities. Second, the strongest
e¤ects are found in the intermediate subsample, for which all alternative oil measures are highly
statistically signicant. Interestingly, the specications employing, arguably, the least endoge-
nous oil measure, oil reserves per capita, has the highest overall explanatory power (as indicated
by the highest log pseudolikelihood statistic). This is an additional indication that Oils baseline
estimates might be biased downward. Assigning a meaningful economic interpretation to the
time ratio estimate of the reserves per capita variable is, however, less straightforward.
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5.3 Conict
As discussed in the literature review, a host of competing or complementary mechanisms may
potentially explain why there is a relationship between natural resources and political survival,
why this relationship may depend on the type of resource, and why institutions may matter.
Several of these mechanisms involve violent conict, such as oppression by the government, rebel
activity, or violent attempts of political takeover by oppositional groups or competing elites.
It is outside the scope of the current paper to investigate all of the di¤erent potential and
relevant mechanisms. As a simple test on the empirical relevance of conict, and its association
with the resource e¤ects, we have investigated whether the resource e¤ects remain when control-
ling for di¤erent types of conict variables. This exercise may inform us whether conict is a
key or even the key mediating variable, or if there may be other, alternative mechanisms at
play.
There exist a variety of conict variables in the literature. Using data from the UCDP/PRIO
dataset and from the World Bank, we have run the baseline and the split sample regressions, with
and without the Average Duration variable, when also controlling for various conict measures.
Importantly, the di¤erent conict measures which captures internal, interstate, or internation-
alized conicts, as well as an index for whether the country is a location of di¤erent types of
conicts, and the number of battle-related deaths are strongly and positively correlated. Hence,
the regression results were very similar independent of which conict measure we use.
In Table 8, we report the results when employing the index for whether the country-year
is listed as a location of a di¤erent types of conict.44 Not surprisingly, whenever statistically
signicant in the regressions, conict is negatively related to the survival in o¢ ce of the political
leadership. However, more interestingly, the resource e¤ects remain, and are, if anything, stronger
than when not including conict among the regressors. It is important to note that this exercise is
not informative about causality; for a recent line of research focussing on the causal relationship
between oil and conict, conditional on institutional and other contextual variables, see, e.g.,
Cotet and Tsui (2010) and Lei and Michaels (2012). Nevertheless, our results are suggestive that
conict whether caused by natural resource wealth or not is not the only driver, and may
even not be a signicant driver, of the resource e¤ects that we document.45
5.4 Further robustness checks
In addition to the robustness exercises discussed above, we have investigated whether the main
results remain robust to: the inclusion of a large battery of regional e¤ects; additional tests for
institutional nonlinearities (using interaction terms between Oil and the institutional variables
44 In this index, 0 indicates that the country-year is not listed as location of a conict, 1 indicates that the
country-year is listed as a location of a minor armed conict, 2 indicates that the country-year is listed as location
of an intermediate armed conict, and 3 indicates that the country-year is listed as location of war.
45Notice that there is a moderate drop in the sample size of some 15-20% in these regressions compared with
the regressions in tables 1 and 3-5, which may account for the minor deviations in the values and precisions of
the point estimates.
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in the split sample regressions); alternative survival functions. The results from these exercises
strongly indicate that our main results are not driven by the specic political contexts in any of
the economic and/or political regions of the world, and that they are robust to a host of di¤erent
survival models and model specications.46
Considering the autocratic leadership durations, a main concern was whether the time ratio
estimate of Oil should be assigned to this variable, or whether it could reect the e¤ects of
the di¤erent autocratic regime types per se. We have investigated this concern by running
separate regressions for each of the autocratic regime types, and the main results indicate that
Oil, whenever statistically signicant, is positively related to political survival even in these small
subsamples of leadership durations.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by the literature on the political and economic e¤ects of natural resource wealth, we
investigate empirically whether natural resource abundance, and in particular the importance
of oil in the economy, a¤ect the political leaderships survival in o¢ ce across countries and over
time. In addition to the question of whether natural resources a¤ect political survival, we also
investigate whether the type of natural resource matters. Our ndings are strongly suggestive
that: (1) natural resources a¤ect political survival; but (2) primarily in non-democratic polities;
and (3) resource type appears key to whether the resources have positive or negative e¤ects for
political survival. Oil is robustly associated with longer political durations in non-democratic
polity types, but not in democracies. Minerals, on the other hand, is associated with shorter
durations in non-democratic polities.
Theory suggests a large variety of potential mechanisms that relate natural resource in-
come and wealth to the survival in o¢ ce of political leaderships. The proposed mechanisms
include populist and patronage spending, less taxation, group-formation e¤ects, strategic spend-
ing, power struggles (within the elites, or between the elites and the opposition), political or
violent oppression, international relations and geopolitics, and violent conict or civil war initi-
ated by rebel groups. It is outside the scope of our analysis to investigate the exact mechanisms
behind the resource e¤ects that we document. Analyzing the path from resource type, di¤er-
ent dimensions of conict and elite dynamics, and the duration in o¢ ce of political leaderships
appear to be a natural next step. As a rst, exploratory test, we added various conict mea-
sures to our baseline regressions and found that the resource e¤ects remain basically unaltered.
This may indicate that also mechanisms that are unrelated to conict and political violence may
be at work. We intend to investigate the role of conict, as well as other potential mediating
mechanisms suggested by theory, in future research.
46See the Online Appendix at: http://www.bi.edu/research/academic-homepage/?ansattid=a0810301 for an
extensive overview of the additional robustness exercises.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Oil 1.011a 1.012a 1.012a 1.011a 1.012a 1.016a 1.017a 1.011a 1.013a 1.020a 1.006
   -percent of GDP (2.29) (2.36) (2.41) (2.33) (2.69) (3.32) (3.40) (2.51) (2.42) (3.09) (0.61)
Minerals 0.973 0.973 0.969 0.960a 1.017 1.001 1.076a 1.047
   -percent of GDP (-1.43) (-1.39) (-1.60) (-2.12) (0.50) (0.02) (1.99) (1.63)
Lootable Diamonds 1.042 1.049 1.043 1.036 1.306a 1.338a 1.879a 1.939a
   -indicator var. (0.36) (0.40) (0.34) (0.30) (2.07) (2.26) (2.44) (2.44)
Non-loot. Diamonds 1.368 1.364 1.371 1.642a 1.429 1.796a 1.371 1.781a
   -indicator var. (1.34) (1.31) (1.31) (2.28) (1.59) (3.21) (0.98) (1.78)
Polity [0,1] 1.034 1.025 1.032 0.671a 0.452a
   -last failure (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (-1.81) (-2.27)
GDP per capita 0.993 0.963 1.075 1.104
   -in logs (-0.19) (-0.78) (1.39) (0.83)
Economic growth 1.017a 1.017a 1.032a 1.049a
   -perc., GDP/cap (1.84) (1.71) (3.09) (2.18)
Population 0.900a 0.895a 0.901
   -in logs (-2.83) (-3.11) (-1.37)
Dependency ratio 0.729 1.680 3.188
(-0.72) (1.08) (1.14)
Sigma 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.93 1.10 1.07 1.02 1.03 0.96 0.95
Log pseudolikel. -604.6 -580.6 -579.2 -552.1 -545.6 -806.1 -751.4 -707.2 -158.1 -131.0 -118.7
# Countries 138 137 137 135 135 152 151 148 117 110 106
# Lead. Durations 500 488 486 465 465 617 598 571 117 110 106
# Failures 363 351 351 349 343 466 446 440 103 95 91
Time at risk 2918 2818 2808 2630 2629 5366 4934 4670 2448 2116 2040
Baseline survival model
Table 1
Notes: The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a level of 
significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio is different from 1. Standard errors are robust, 
clustered at the country-level. Polity[0,1]  is a normalized measure of the Polity variable and ranges from 0 to 1.
Baseline sample (>1974) Excluded (<1975)Full sample
Institutional variable
Scale/Nondem Scale Scale Nondem Scale Scale Nondem Scale Scale Nondem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Oil 1.023a 1.026a 0.997 1.022a 1.024a 0.998 1.015a 1.020a 0.998
   -percent of GDP (2.37)   (2.60)   (-0.35)   (2.22)   (2.63)   (-0.35)   (1.87)   (2.27)   (-0.28)   
Oil × Inst.var. 0.974a 0.972a 1.022a 0.974a 0.971a 1.019a 0.982 0.977 1.021a
   -Inst.var. last failure (-1.77)   (-1.77)   (2.10)   (-1.92)   (-1.97)   (1.87)   (-1.38)   (-1.50)   (1.68)   
Minerals 0.862a 0.982 0.873a 0.989 0.888a 0.982
   -share of GDP (-2.68)   (-0.80)   (-2.56)   (-0.51)   (-1.88)   (-0.80)   
Minerals × Inst.var. 1.203a 0.912a 1.131a 0.904a 1.104 0.915a
   -Inst.var. last failure (2.27)   (-1.86)   (2.05)   (-2.29)   (1.40)   (-1.87)   
Lootable Diamonds 0.792 1.322 1.086 1.328 1.209 1.277
   -indicator var. (-0.62) (1.52) (0.16) (1.55) (-0.50) (1.35)
LD × Inst.var. 1.577 0.612 1.233 0.877 1.056 0.955
   -Inst.var. last failure (0.81)   (-1.62)   (0.32)   (-0.33)   (0.10)   (-0.10)   
Non-loot. Diamonds 2.384 1.470 4.026 1.343 3.058 1.667a
   -indicator var. (0.89) (1.38) (1.10) (1.06) (0.98) (1.81)
ND × Inst.var. 0.609 1.460 0.367 2.798 0.502 1.419
   -Inst.var. last failure (-0.44)   (0.76)   (-0.74)   (1.17)   (-0.55)   (0.30)   
Institutional variable 1.216 1.042 0.920 1.077 1.041 1.046 1.108 1.146 0.902
   -last failure (0.99)   (0.16)   (-0.58)   (0.32)   (0.15)   (0.27)   (0.52)   (0.58)   (-0.57)   
Baseline controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sigma 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.88 0.88
Log pseudolikel. -555.0 -541.5 -541.5 -489.3 -469.2 -468.3 -490.5 -471.4 -470.7
# Countries 135 135 135 129 129 129 129 129 129
# Lead. Durations 465 465 465 419 419 419 419 419 419
# Failures 349 349 349 309 309 309 309 309 309
Time at risk 2630 2630 2630 2362 2362 2362 2362 2362 2362
Notes: The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a level of 
significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio is different from 1. Standard errors are robust, 
clustered at the country-level.  Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1] and Xconst[0,1]  are normalized measures of the Polity, Xpolity and Xconst 
variables, respectivley, and range from 0 to 1. Nondem indicates the use of dummy variable which is equal to one if the LD is 
categorized as either intermediate (anocracy) or autocratic and otherwise (i.e., if democratic)  equal to zero. The thresholds used in the 
categorization differ depending on which polity variable is used; see the main text for definitions.
Institution and resource interactions
Table 2
Polity[0,1] Xpolity[0,1] Xconst[0,1]
Institutional variable Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Xpolity[0,1] Xconst[0,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Oil 0.997 0.986a 1.000 0.991 0.996 0.998 0.999 1.004
   -percent of GDP (-0.45) (-1.75) (0.00) (-1.10) (-0.45) (-0.23) (-0.12) (0.51)
Minerals 0.974 0.992 1.006 1.137a 1.137a 0.969 1.006 1.005
   -share of GDP (-1.04) (-0.33) (0.20) (3.32) (2.63) (-1.40) (0.34) (0.26)
Lootable Diamonds 1.362a 1.499a 1.363a 1.241 1.394 1.256 1.181 1.185
   -indicator variable (1.82) (1.83) (1.87) (1.17) (1.35) (1.32) (0.96) (0.88)
Non-loot. Diamonds 1.409 1.227 1.332 1.275 0.890 1.522a 1.450a 1.382
   -indicator variable (1.49) (0.67) (1.29) (1.09) (-0.36) (1.87) (1.66) (1.35)
Institutional variable 0.218 0.507 0.193 0.153a 0.240 0.140a 0.109a 0.500
   -last failure (-1.38) (-0.56) (-1.31) (-1.93) (-0.98) (-1.94) (-2.63) (-0.78)
Democratic age 1.219 1.304
(0.53) (0.70)
Years left in current term 1.300a 1.270a
(4.66) (3.67)
Presidential 1.603a 1.287a
   -indicator variable (3.64) (1.72)
Majoritarian 0.782a 0.879
   -indicator variable (-1.82) (-0.93)
Exec.'s party all houses 1.350a 1.343a
   -at entry, indicator variable (2.10)  (1.83)  
Party fract. in legislature 0.775 0.641a
   -at entry (1.33)  (1.85) 
Average duration 1.028a 1.021a 1.023a
(2.49) (2.07) (2.23)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trade, Inflation No No No Yes Yes No No No
Gov't exp., Education exp. No No No Yes Yes No No No
Sigma 0.72 0.77 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.73
Log pseudolikelihood -283.7 -236.5 -202.1 -251.4 -163.0 -279.3 -275.7 -251.6
# Countries 87 85 79 85 76 87 87 87
# LD 290 280 218 270 204 290 290 290
# Failures 219 209 158 199 144 219 219 219
Time at risk 1468 1418 1111 1356 1037 1468 1468 1468
Democratic polities
Table 3
Notes: The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a level of 
significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio is different from 1. Standard errors are robust, 
clustered at the country-level. Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1] and Xconst[0,1] are normalized measures of the Polity, Xpolity and Xconst 
variables, respectivley, and range from 0 to 1.
Institutional variable Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Polity[0,1] Xpolity[0,1] Xconst[0,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oil 1.025a 1.017a 1.017a 1.024a 1.014a -
   -percent of GDP (2.45) (1.67) (1.67) (2.45) (1.73)
Minerals 0.789a 0.809a 0.819a 0.793a 0.911a -
   -share of GDP (-2.28) (-2.06) (-1.92) (-2.22) (-2.03)
Lootable Diamonds 0.551a 0.566a 0.541a 0.553a 0.966 -
   -indicator variable (-2.00) (-1.66) (-1.70) (-1.97) (-0.11)
Non-loot. Diamonds 2.491a 2.257a 2.052a 2.369a 2.572 -
   -indicator variable (2.53) (2.13) (1.66) (2.17) (1.01)
Institutional variable 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.001 1.931 -
   -last failure (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (1.13)
Trade 1.004 1.004
   -percent of GDP (0.64) (0.66)
Gov't exp. 1.004 1.002
   -percent of GDP (0.15) (0.08)
Average duration 1.013 1.007 1.077a -
   -in years (0.63) (0.38) (2.71)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Sigma 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.01 -
Log pseudolikelihood -125.9 -121.3 -121.1 -125.8 -136.5 -
# Countries 56 54 54 56 59 -
# LD 98 95 95 98 112 -
# Failures 74 72 72 74 80 -
Time at risk 585 557 557 585 757 -
Intermediate polities
Table 4
Notes: The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a level of 
significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio is different from 1. Standard errors are robust, 
clustered at the country-level.  Polity[0,1]  and XPolity[0,1]  are normalized measures of the Polity and the XPolity variables and 
range from 0 to 1. The Xconst[0,1] regression did not converge.
Instititional var. Polity[0,1]Polity[0,1]Polity[0,1]Polity[0,1]Polity[0,1]Polity[0,1]Polity[0,1]Xpolity[0,1]Xconst[0,1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Oil 1.029a 1.047a 1.030a 1.019a 1.021 1.015 1.009 1.003 1.016a
   -percent of GDP (2.11) (2.25) (2.33) (1.97) (1.63) (1.31) (0.95) (0.14) (1.79)
Minerals 0.884a 0.798 0.898 0.957 0.922 0.904 0.863a 0.194a 0.959
   -share of GDP (-1.81) (-1.52) (-1.46) (-0.66) (-1.17) (-1.34) (-2.38) (-2.96) (-0.39) 
Lootable Diamonds 0.706 0.578 0.644 0.875 0.952 0.747 0.708 NA 0.841
   -indicator var. (-0.63) (-0.88) (-0.84) (-0.29) (-0.09) (-0.54) (-0.77) - (-0.33)
Non-loot. Diamond 1.542 1.027 1.686 1.839 1.257 0.957 0.877 1.674 1.161
   -indicator var. (0.28) (0.03) (0.35) (0.53) (0.17) (-0.03) (-0.12) (0.28) (0.13)
Instititional var. 0.011 0.079 0.002a 0.041 0.0003a 0.117 0.040 1.6E-6 7.929
   -last failure (-1.10) (-0.58) (-1.66) (-0.98) (-2.13) (-0.47) (-0.91) (-1.49) (0.69) 
Trade 1.000                         
   -percent of GDP (0.04)                         
Inflation 1.004                         
   -annual rates (0.65)                         
Gov't exp. 0.948                         
   -percent of GDP (-1.04)                         
Education exp. 1.379                         
   -percent of GDP (1.45)                         
Average duration 1.238a 1.187a 1.158a
   -in years (3.06) (4.15) (2.84)
Personal rule 1.586           
(1.03)           
Military regime 0.282a
(-3.60)
Single party reg. 4.033a
(2.07)
Monarchy 11.18a
(3.16)
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 1.21 1.13 1.20 1.07 1.13 1.15 1.02 0.66 1.06
Log pseudolikel. -104.0 -72.8 -99.7 -93.4 -97.0 -97.3 -91.7 -10.7 -91.4
# Countries 45 37 44 44 44 44 45 15 42
# LD 77 60 74 74 74 74 77 21 72
# Failures 56 43 54 54 54 54 56 11 53
Time at risk 577 412 566 566 566 566 577 176 464
Notes: The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a level of 
significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio is different from 1. Standard errors are robust, 
clustered at the country-level.  Polity[0,1], Xpolity[0,1] and Xconst[0,1] are normalized measures of the Polity, Xpolity and Xconst 
variables, respectivley, and range from 0 to 1.
Autocratic polities
Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Oil 1.015a 1.013a 1.006 1.009 1.020a 1.016a 1.021a 1.018a
   -percent of GDP (3.63) (3.96) (1.03) (1.49) (2.40) (2.28) (2.48) (2.16)
Minerals 0.973 0.979 0.979 0.986 1.013 1.036 0.917a 0.901a
   -share of GDP (-1.47) (-1.06) (-1.19) (-1.01) (0.14) (0.40) (-1.76) (-2.09) 
Lootable Diamonds 1.041 0.969 1.151 1.001 0.839 0.775 1.144 1.171
   -indicator var. (0.34) (-0.25) (0.99) (0.01) (-0.60) (-0.90) (0.34) (0.43)
Non-loot. Diamonds 1.500a 1.365a 1.490a 1.492a 1.331 1.004 1.251 1.045
   -indicator var. (2.22) (1.72) (2.01) (2.19) (0.96) (0.01) (0.38) (0.08)
Polity [0,1] 0.826 1.046 0.368 0.361 0.645 0.860 0.004a 0.065
   -last failure (-1.14) (0.27) (-1.18) (-1.33) (-0.64) (-0.22) (-2.17) (-0.91) 
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average Duration No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sigma 0.85 0.81 0.67 0.64 1.01 0.98 1.03 0.98
Log pseudolikel. -703.8 -683.7 -351.0 -338.1 -176.3 -171.1 -140.4 -134.2
# Countries 143 143 88 88 66 66 59 59
# Lead. Durations 629 629 382 382 138 138 117 117
# Failures 508 508 312 312 110 110 86 86
Time at risk 3064 3064 1561 1561 741 741 762 762
Regressions on chief executive using the POLITY categorization
Table 6
Notes: The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a 
level of significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio is different from 1. Standard errors 
are robust, clustered at the country-level.  Polity[0,1]  is a normalized measure of the Polity variable and ranges from 0 to 1.
Baseline Democratic Intermediate Autocratic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Oil last failure 0.996 1.024a 1.031a                
   (using production vol. (-0.53) (2.07) (2.28)                
  in last year of failure)
Oil reserves 0.899 4.073a 1.275a                
   (proven, per capita) (-0.80) (3.67) (3.14)                
Oil per capita 0.928a 3.579a 1.149a
   (-2.64) (2.21) (1.67)
Sigma 0.71 0.73 0.72 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.22 1.22 1.23
Log pseudolikel. -261.3 -270.3 -282.5 -126.7 -102.2 -126.5 -103.9 -78.6 -104.9
# Countries 78 87 87 56 48 56 45 38 45
# Lead. Durations 268 283 290 98 82 98 77 63 77
# Failures 206 212 219 74 61 74 56 45 56
Time at risk 1360 1401 1468 585 475 585 577 441 577
Alternative oil measures in the Table 2-regressions, colummns (3), (6), and (9)
Table 7
Notes: All regressions include the baseline set of control variables. The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival 
model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a level of significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio 
is different from 1. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the country-level.
Democratic Intermediate Autocratic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Oil 1.012a 1.011a 0.992 0.993 1.033a 1.033a 1.029a 1.016a
   -percent of GDP (2.18)   (2.31)   (-0.79)   (-0.72)   (3.33)   (3.34)   (2.27)   (1.65)   
Minerals 0.945a 0.948a 0.969 0.962 0.700a 0.700a 0.883a 0.872a
   -share of GDP (-3.37) (-2.90) (-1.28) (-1.77) (-5.21) (-5.12) (-2.62) (-2.78)
Lootable Diamonds 0.863 0.792 1.075 0.974 0.382a 0.382a 0.540 0.682
   -indicator variable (-1.13) (-1.56) (0.47) (0.17) (-2.86) (-2.69) (-1.33) (-0.87)
Non-loot. Diamonds 1.709a 1.702a 1.459a 1.591a 2.523a 2.522a 1337.6a 3012.1a
   -indicator variable (2.10) (2.10) (1.70) (2.12) (1.93) (1.84) (10.49) (7.80)
Polity[0.1] 1.168 1.229 0.391 0.211 1.095 1.095 0.023 0.069
   -last failure (0.72)   (1.00)   (-0.82)   (-1.45)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (-0.94)   (-0.68)   
Conflict 0.906a 0.896a 0.900a 0.890a 0.705a 0.705a 1.221 1.143
   -Index [0,3] (-2.11)   (-2.11)   (-2.30)   (-2.48)   (-3.14)   (-3.15)   (1.51)   (0.82)   
Average duration 1.032a 1.032a 1.000 1.135a
   -in years (2.21)   (2.21)   (0.00)   (1.73)   
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 0.87 0.86 0.69 0.69 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.89
Log pseudolikel. -437.5 -432.9 -232.2 -228.7 -90.6 -90.6 -74.5 -70.4
# Countries 120 120 78 78 51 51 37 37
# Lead.Durations 397 397 248 248 83 83 66 66
# Failures 291 291 188 188 56 56 47 47
Time at risk 2107 2107 1234 1234 463 463 410 410
Notes: The table displays time ratio estimates using the Log-normal survival model. Z-statistics in parentheses. a indicates a level of 
significance of <10 percent of the two-sided test of the hypothesis that the time ratio is different from 1. Standard errors are robust, 
clustered at the country-level.  Polity[0,1] is a normalized measure of the Polity variable and ranges from 0 to 1. The Conflict index is 
equivalent to the Conflict Location variable in the UCDP/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002), where: 0 indicates that the country-
year is not listed as location of a conflict; 1 indicates that the country-year is listed as a location of a minor armed conflict; 2 indicates 
that the country-year is listed as location of an intermediate armed conflict; 3 indicates that the country-year is listed as location of 
war. Notice that there are only two countries (Tanzania and Swaziland) in the Autocratic sample with non lootable diamonds - both 
of which have no recorded political leadership changes within the sample - which may explain the implausibly high coefficient on this 
variable.
Conflict
Table 8
Democratic Intermediate AutocraticBaseline sample
Sample: Baseline Full Excluded Democratic Intermediate Autocratic
(>1974) (<1975)
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(St.d/N) (St.d/N) (St.d/N) (St.d/N) (St.d/N) (St.d/N)
Duration, party of chief exec. 4.95 8.40 20.45 4.90 4.49 5.57
(4.00/366) (11.11/471) (17.70/105) (3.20/220) (4.09/82) (5.85/63)
Natural resource variables:
  Oil 5.37 6.69 9.63 2.98 7.00 10.11
  - Percent of GDP (13.95/3141) (15.49/4553) (18.11/1412) (7.62/1550) (16.24/6.49) (20.77/728)
  Minerals 0.63 0.77 1.10 0.71 0.32 0.53
  - Percent of GDP (2.32) (2.46/4227) (2.75/1267) (2.38/1554) (0.94/621) (1.86/674)
  Lootable diamonds 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.14 0.17 0.20
  - Indicator variable
  Non-lootable diamonds 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11
  - Indicator variable
Selected control variables:
  GDP per capita 5356 5075 4425 8798 996 2008
  - In constant 2000 USD (8139/2986) (7883/4274) (7218/1288) (9687/1556) (1249/623) (4199/647)
  Population 29 34 43 45 17 18
  - In millions (89/3409) (119/4913) (167/1504) (127/1556) (22/656) (26/746)
  Dependency ratio 0.71 0.72 0.76 0.61 0.81 0.84
(0.19/3409) (0.20/4913) (0.19/1504) (0.15/1556) (0.18/656) (0.16/746)
Institutional  variables:
Institutional quality
  Polity score 2.9 0.8 -3.4 8.3 0.0 -5.7
(6.9/3021) (7.5/4553) (6.8/1532) (2.7/1562) (4.5/650) (3.8/747)
Polity types:
  Democracy (percent of sample) 0.53 0.40 0.16
  Autocracy (percent of sample) 0.25 0.38 0.61
  Intermediate (percent of sample) 0.22 0.22 0.23
Constitutional rules:
Presidential (percent of sample) 0.48
Majoritarian  (percent of sample) 0.71
Regime type:
Military regime (percent of sample) 0.33
Personal rule (percent of sample) 0.21
Single party (percent of sample) 0.31
Monarchy (percent of sample) 0.15
No. of countries in sample 138 152 117 87 56 45
Summary statistics, selected variables
Table A1
Notes: In the second row, under the heading 'Institutional measures', 'N' of the 'Duration time' refers to the number of failures in the 
respective samples.
